a tale of arbitrage opportunities by Reis, Nuno Alexandre Tirapicos Dos Santos
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master Degree in 
Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics. 
 
 
The EU ETS: A Tale of Arbitrage Opportunities 
 
 
 
Nuno Alexandre Tirapicos Dos Santos Reis, Nº 20329 
 
 
 
A Project carried out on the Master in Finance Program, under the supervision of: 
João Pedro Pereira 
 
 
 
24th of January 2019 
  
The EU ETS: A Tale of Arbitrage Opportunities1 
Nuno Alexandre Tirapicos Dos Santos Reis 
 
 
Abstract 
This work studies the presence of arbitrage opportunities following the 
announcements of the Market Stability Reserve of the EU ETS on May 2017, using 
the cost of carry model and three EUA futures contracts – December 2016, 
December 2017 and December 2018. The results suggest a long-run link between 
the spot and futures prices, but the cost of carry model does not explain well the 
price dynamics in the short run, which might be a sign for the presence of arbitrage 
opportunities in this market. These conclusions are especially important for 
European authorities, since they convey the inefficiency of the scheme.  
Keywords: Energy Finance, European carbon market, European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
JEL Classification: G14, Q02, Q56 
  
                                                          
1 Thanks are due to my advisor, João Pedro Pereira, for all the support and guidance; to professor Paulo 
M. M. Rodrigues for teaching Econometrics so clearly and with such passion and to my dear 
grandmother, for all the sacrifices she made to raise me.  
1. Introduction 
Climate change effects are nowadays a reality. The majority of the countries is starting to 
realise the pernicious effects pollution has on human health, on the environment and on the 
economy, either through direct or indirect channels. For that purpose, most of them signed and 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and more recently the Paris Agreement, in an attempt to mitigate 
the ecological footprint our actions have on the planet.  
On these agreements, among other things, the participants committed themselves to reduce 
their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, by linking the multiple carbon emissions trading 
systems to avoid double counting, reporting regularly on their emissions and on their efforts to 
reduce them. Even though some large emitters have not ratified the Agreement – such as Russia, 
Turkey and Iran – and the US has shown their intention to withdraw, and therefore are not 
obliged to actively reduce their emissions’ levels through the establishment or the further 
development of their carbon trading systems, the emissions trading systems across the world 
transacted nearly US$82 billion in 2018 (World Bank Group, 2018), a 56% increase when 
compared with the 2017 level of US$52 billion (World Bank Group, 2017). The majority of 
this volume is attributed with the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the 
first and the biggest major carbon market accounting for US$38 billion (Hodges, Krukowska 
and Carr, 2018) - 46% of the global market -, launched on the 1st of January 2005 as the major 
pillar of the European Union’s climate policy. After several years of low prices, this cap-and-
trade system is finally starting to work the way it was intended, as the European regulators 
implemented some policies to deal with the undesirable excess of allowances, that accounted a 
total of 1.6 billion, on 12th May 2017 (European Commission, 2018). 
The two main policies pursued by the regulators to deal with that issue were the backloading 
and the implementation of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR). The backloading was a short-
term solution executed in February 2014, and consisted in the postponement of a total of 900 
million allowances from 2014 to 2016, reducing the supply in each year, in an attempt to 
rebalance supply and demand and driving up the equilibrium prices, whereas the MSR is a long-
term solution intended to stabilize the prices of the carbon allowances and will only start 
operating in January 2019. It works on the following way: If the total number of allowances in 
circulation exceeds the upper threshold of 833 million, a percentage of that excess is added to 
the reserve and stored, being released only when the total number of allowances in circulation 
is lower than the lower threshold of 400 million allowances. With this mechanism, the European 
authorities meant to drive up the prices of the allowances in the present, and decreasing them 
into the future, as the cap keeps diminishing, achieving this way a smoother path of prices. 
Following the announcements of the European Parliament (2017) and of the Council of the 
European Union (2017), suggesting and adopting changes on the Market Stability Reserve, the 
market finally started to soar, after a prolonged slump: from approximately 5€ per tonne, the 
prices rose up to approximately 20€ per tonne, reaching 2009 values. This opportunity was only 
foreseen by some hedge funds and investment banks, which stuck with the sector even during 
its long slump, such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley. However, some of the 
most successful winners were some relatively small hedge funds like Northlander Advisors, 
which was up 35,8% net of fees in August, and Lansdowne Partners Limited, which was up 
11% by September, 2018 (Sheppard, 2018). This raises the question: Was this level of profits 
achieved by mere luck? Or are there persistent arbitrage opportunities related with market 
inefficiency? 
The present work tries to study that, by using the cost-of-carry model to analyse the long-
run link between the spot and futures prices of carbon, using econometric tools for that purpose. 
The existing literature is focused on two types of contracts: the intra-phase contracts, which are 
those that started and were completed within the same phase of the EU ETS, and the inter-phase 
ones, those which commenced and finished in different phases. That division is justified since 
the pricing mechanisms and the relationships between the spot and the futures are different 
between the two types of contracts aforementioned, following the arguments found by 
Daskalakis, Phychoyios and Markellos (2009). Only the intra-phase contracts are considered 
here.  
With respect to this specific type of contracts, the literature is ambiguous: Joyeux and 
Milunovich (2007, 2010) raised the possibility of arbitrage opportunities in the carbon market 
by proving that the futures contracts under analysis were not priced according to the cost-of-
carry model, while Daskalakis, Phychoyios and Markellos (2009) showed that these contracts 
were well described by the cost-of-carry model with zero convenience yields. However, as 
suggested by Daskalakis and Markellos (2008), those profits could be explained by the 
immaturity of the market, since it was a recent market at that time, and by the restrictions on 
short-selling and banking European Allowances (EUA) from one phase to the next one, thus 
affecting the efficiency of the market. But from the literature under analysis to this date, several 
years have passed: the 3rd phase of EU ETS was initiated and, with it, some modifications 
described above – the MSR and backloading – were implemented. Therefore, some questions 
still remain: Did the 3rd phase and the introduction of the MSR increase market efficiency? 
What is behind the profits registered by some investment banks and hedge funds? Higher 
returns associated with a higher level of risk, or arbitrage opportunities? These are the questions 
this work tries to answer. 
This thesis is organized as follows: Part 2 presents the econometric model used. Part 3 
introduces the dataset used for the purpose of this analysis and the unit root tests, as well as 
some descriptive statistics of the series. Part 4 studies the long-run relationship between the 
spot and the futures prices series selected. Part 5 examines the presence, or not, of arbitrage 
opportunities, using the cost-of-carry model. Part 6 concludes the thesis. 
 
  
2. Econometric Model 
The cost of carry model represents the net cost of holding an investment position, and is 
generally used for the pricing of futures contracts. It expresses the relationship between the 
futures and spot prices, compounded by the cost of carry, which, in turn, can encompass the 
risk-free interest rate, the convenience yield (in case of a commodity), the dividend yield (in 
case of stocks paying dividends), storage/transportation costs, and the time to delivery of the 
contract. This relationship can be summarized by the following equation: 
 Ft,T = St e
(rf + u – y) * (T – t) (1) 
being Ft,T the actual price of a futures contract expiring in T-t years, St the prevailing spot price, 
rf the discount rate, u the storage/transportation cost and y the convenience/dividend yield. The 
no arbitrage condition required by the model implies that the risk-free rate is the appropriate 
discount rate to be used (Hull, 2008). 
In the specific case of the EU ETS, the storage/transportation costs are not really a concern 
– they are at most documents – as well as the dividend yield/convenience yield – firstly because 
the emission allowances do not pay any dividends, and secondly because the carbon emitters 
are not required to constantly hold spot allowances. The only time they are required to hold 
those allowances are at the time they must settle their carbon accounts.  
Therefore, the cost of carry model is simplified to the following: 
 Ft,T = St e 
rf * (T – t) (2) 
Theoretically, and in a perfect market without frictions, the aforementioned condition 
should always apply at any time. Nonetheless, given the presence of imperfections such as 
restrictions on short-selling, transactions costs, asymmetric information, among others, this 
condition might not apply and differences between the theoretical price and the traded price are 
bound to arise, especially in the short-run (Mackinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988). 
By taking natural logarithms in both sides of the previous equation, we were able to simplify 
the cost of carry model: 
ln[Ft,T ]= ln [St e 
rf * (T – t)] ⬄ 
 ln[Ft,T ]= ln [St]+ln[e rf * (T – t)] ⬄ 
ft= st + rf(T-t)*ln[e]  
With the transformations previously applied, we were able to achieve a long-run 
cointegrating equation: 
 ft= st + rf(T-t)+ vt (3) 
being st ≡ ln[St], ft ≡ ln[Ft] and vt a disturbance term. (T-t) is the reverse time trend that initiates 
at T – the maturity of the contract – and converges to zero as t approaches T. 
To evaluate the validity of the cost of carry model, we reformulate the cointegrating 
equation as follows: 
 ft = αst + β[rf(T-t)]+ vt (4) 
Two types of hypothesis were considered at this stage: 
➢ H0: vt is stationary, this is, the equation above-mentioned exhibits a cointegration 
relationship; 
➢ H0: α = β = 1 this is, the constraints implied by the cost of carry model hold. 
The interpretation of the previous hypothesis has the following meaning: 
If the equation exhibits a cointegration relationship and the restrictions implied by the cost 
of carry hold, that would imply that there is a long-run relationship between the spot prices, the 
futures prices and the risk-free rate, in accordance with the cost of carry model. Moreover, that 
would also imply the efficiency of the carbon futures market, in a manner that the cost of carry 
model explains well the price dynamics in the short run and so it is not expected arbitrage 
opportunities to show up between holding futures contracts or spot instruments carried until 
maturity at the risk-free rate. 
For its turn, if the equation exhibits a cointegration relationship but the restrictions implied 
by the cost of carry model do not hold, that would imply that the long-run link would still be 
viable – this is, the series move together in the long-run; however, that relationship is not given 
by the cost of carry model in the short run, and therefore it would not be strange if arbitrage 
opportunities appear in the carbon market. The restrictions implied by the cost of carry model 
stem from the definition of market efficiency: according to Fama (1970), an efficient market in 
its weak form would imply that the changes on prices from one period to the next should be 
unpredictable. 
The last scenario is achieved if the equation does not exhibit a cointegration relationship 
and the restriction implied by the cost of carry model do not apply as well. In such scenario, 
not only the futures price is disentangled from the spot prices, meaning their paths are 
completely independent of each other, but would again point out the possibility for arbitrage 
opportunities to be persistent in this market or that the price dynamics in this market are not 
explained by the cost of carry model, which confirms the conclusions of Joyeux and Milunovich 
(2007, 2010). 
By looking at the literature, we can find examples of the application of this econometric 
approach in several financial markets, whether in commodities such as oil, or in equity markets. 
For instance, Wahab and Lashgari (1993) shown that the spot and futures prices for both the 
S&P 500 and the FTSE 100 were cointegrated, meaning there is a long-run link between the 
two markets and they trend together, a conclusion in accordance with market efficiency. Passing 
on to commodities, which should be the focus of the literature review since the allowances of 
the EU ETS are considered themselves a commodity, we found more support to our model: 
Zapata and Fortenbery (1996) proved the joint cointegration of futures and spot prices as well 
as the interest rates of Chicago corn and soybean market; for its turn, Yang, Bessler and 
Leatham (2001) tested the cointegration of US agricultural commodity futures and spot 
markets, indicating that not even the asset storability affected that long-run relationship, putting 
in question works of previous authors (Covey and Bessler, 1995). Lastly, in the oil commodity 
market, Crowder and Hamed (1993) also used a cointegration analysis to study the relationship 
between the spot and futures in this market, while Lee and Zeng (2011) applied a new method 
of quantile cointegrating regressions to examine the relationship of spot and futures oil markets 
of West Texas Intermediate, corroborating one more time the long-run link between the two 
series, although with a caveat: the length of the future contract has an impact on the 
cointegrating relationship between the futures and the spot oil prices. 
 
3. Dataset, Descriptive Statistics & Unit Root Tests 
The dataset consists on daily observations of carbon spot prices, two interest rate variables 
– the 1 month and 3 months Euribor – and carbon futures prices of the December 2016, 
December 2017 and December 2018 contracts, over the period ranging from 02/05/2016 to 
31/10/2018. 
All the series were collected from DataStream, although the spot and futures carbon prices 
refer to the settlement prices of the European Energy Exchange (EEX). A graph with the spot 
and carbon prices is presented next: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Spot and futures carbon prices 
 Source: Authors’ construction. Based on the information gathered on DataStream. 
 
By the simple observation of the graph, some features stand out: the four series move in 
close relation to each other and in the same direction – in fact, their relationship is so close that 
the series overlap each other. While in the beginning they do not seem to have an upward or 
downward trend, that fact appears to have changed from the second trimester of 2017 onwards. 
This increase in prices is consistent with the announcement of the European Commission on 
the 12th of May 2017, on which they published for the first time the number of carbon 
allowances in circulation. That number plays a very important role for the functioning of the 
MSR, by allowing the investors to know exactly how many allowances are going to be stored 
in the reserve or released from it, helping in the forecast of the prices. 
The next step would be to analyse some descriptive statistics of the series, to understand 
their properties: 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of EUA spot and futures prices and short-term Euribor 
 
 
Table 1 presents us some interesting insights. The first thing to be stressed out is the daily 
standard deviation of the prices – from a very low value in the beginning of the sample, we can 
see it increase, especially in the spot and in the 2018 futures contract, which captures the 
remarkable increase of the prices of allowances; the kurtosis and skewness coefficients of the 
returns suggest a leptokurtic and positive skewed distribution for the 2016 and 2017 contracts 
and a leptokurtic and negative skewed distribution of the spot and the 2018 futures series – 
which indicates that, in the first two contracts, there is a higher frequency of outcomes in the 
tails of the distribution, although with a higher change of extremely positive outcomes, whereas 
in the last two the higher frequency of outcomes in tails also holds, but now with a higher 
change of extremely negative outcomes. This is consistent with historical returns of financial 
assets, which usually show little evidence of skewness but high evidence of excess kurtosis 
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinley, 1997). 
The Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and Bera, 1987) uses the previous results of skewness and 
kurtosis to test whether the underlying distribution of a series is normal or not. In case of 
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the underlying distribution is not normal; in the 
Eur1m Eur3m
Prices Log Ret Prices Log Ret Prices Log Ret Prices Log Ret Eur1m Eur3m
# Obs 166 165 426 425 653 652 653 652 653 653
Mean 5,184 -0,0011 5,5603 0,0004 8,7515 0,0015 8,6957 0,0015 -0,3698 -0,318
Median 4,975 -0,0016 5,275 0 6,15 0,0018 6,07 0,0017 -0,371 -0,327
Maximum 6,51 0,1085 7,92 0,1241 25,24 0,123 25,19 0,1263 -0,343 -0,25
Minimum 3,91 -0,1282 3,94 -0,127 3,99 -0,1941 3,91 -0,1945 -0,375 -0,332
Std. Dev 0,6886 0,0341 0,9584 0,0324 5,081 0,0309 5,0916 0,0308 0,00527 0,018
Skewness 0,0434 0,1378 0,7921 0,085 1,2579 -0,3778 1,2541 -0,3805 3,199 2,1171
Kurtosis 1,5908 3,8002 2,6475 4,9898 3,3073 6,589 3,2961 6,6941 13,1367 7,0221
Jarque-Bera 13,7875* 4,9251 46,7493* 70,6249* 174,7656* 365,4529* 173,5606* 386,4687* 3910,143* 927,9421*
Note: One star indicates significance at 5% level;
         Prices refers to daily closing price, and Log Ret refers to logarithmic returns
Dec 16 Sett Dec 17 Sett Dec 18 Sett Spot
series under analysis, only the returns of the 2016 futures contract seem to have a normal 
distribution at a 5% confidence level, while for the others, both at levels and returns, the normal 
is clearly rejected. 
Before going to the cointegration, one earlier step is required: to assess the stationarity of 
each individual series using unit root tests (Mills and Markellos, 2008). However, since one of 
the usual problems with this type of tests is the existence of structural breaks of the series, which 
reduces their power, we decided to apply the usual Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979, and Said and Dickey, 1984) jointly with a unit root test which allows 
for a structural break (Vogelsang and Perron, 1998) to evaluate the differences in conclusions 
between the two. If the conclusions are different, it would be a signal for the presence of a 
structural break. 
The following table resumes the both unit root tests employed on the logarithmic spot and 
futures series, as well as in the interest rate series: 
 
Table 2: Unit root tests 
 
 
H0
C TC C TC C TC
ADF Unit Root -0,0883 -2,4213 -5,4503* -4,8642* -6,1667* -3,9696*
Perron Unit Root -4,159 -4,3184 -7,7737* -7,8941* -5,5888* -5,5714*
Note: One star indicates significance at 5% level
         C refers to the unit root test only with constant, and TC refers to the unit root test with trend and constant
Ln(Spot) Eur1m Eur3m
H0
C TC C TC C TC
ADF Unit Root -1,8952 -1,788 -1,6822 -2,5586 -0,0998 -2,446
Perron Unit Root -3,963 -3,7577 -4,1273 -4,261 -4,2021 -4,3144
Note: One star indicates significance at 5% level
         C refers to the unit root test only with constant, and TC refers to the unit root test with trend and constant
Ln(Fut16) Ln(Fut17) Ln(Fut18)
  
Table 2 concludes that both tests yield the same conclusions. The null of an existing unit 
root is accepted on levels for the spot and for all the futures series while it is rejected for the 
interest rate series – this means that logarithmic spot and futures are not stationary, whereas the 
interest rates are. The null is only rejected – and so stationarity is achieved -  by applying first 
differences to the logarithms of spot and futures, which specifies that those series are integrated 
of order 1 – I(1) – while the interest rates are integrated of order 0 – I(0).  
Since the conclusions of both the ADF test and the unit root test with a structural break are 
the same, that means that our series do not have structural breaks, a feature that simplifies the 
analysis. This conclusion is consistent with the visual inspection of Figure 1, in which we do 
not observe the existence of structural breaks. 
 
4. Cointegration Analysis 
Having fulfilled the requirements needed to perform the cointegration analysis – the 
identification of the order of integration of the series – we proceed with the cointegration tests. 
For this purpose, the selected model was the one proposed by Engle and Granger (1987). 
The interest rates were left out of the cointegrating regression since the aforementioned model 
requires all variables to be integrated or order 1, which is opposite to the order of integration of 
the interest rates. Thus, the potential cointegrating regression would be: 
 st = θ0 + θ1 ft + zt (5) 
In this case, the cointegration is verified if the residuals of the cointegrating regression are 
integrated of order 0. The following table summarizes the results of the regression: 
H0
C TC C TC C TC C TC
ADF Unit Root -13,3971* -13,3842* -22,6655* -22,7007* -25,7927* -25,8288* -25,3417* -25,3759*
Perron Unit Root -13,9531* -14,0419* -6,4737* -6,9456* -7,5406* -7,6568* -7,8487* -7,9153*
Note: One star indicates significance at 5% level
         C refers to the unit root test only with constant, and TC refers to the unit root test with trend and constant
ΔLn(Spot)ΔLn(Fut16) ΔLn(Fut17) ΔLn(Fut18)
Table 3: Cointegration Analysis 
 
 
This time only the ADF test was applied, since we already proved that structural breaks are 
not an issue of our model; therefore, the Perron test with a structural break is not used. 
The conclusion is as expected: Since we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, we can 
argue that the residuals of the cointegrating regressions of the three futures prices are integrated 
of order 0, so stationary. The implication of this result follows the same conclusions of the 
authors previously mentioned: There is a long-run relationship between the spot and the futures 
series consistent with the cost of carry model. 
 
5. Arbitrage opportunities using the cost of carry model 
Having proved one of the hypothesis of this paper, we pass now to the other: assessing if 
the restrictions implied by the cost of carry model hold, so that we could understand the 
presence of arbitrage opportunities in the short-run. 
The tables below have the summary of the cointegrating regression and the joint 
significance test under analysis: 
 
Table 4: Cointegration regression estimation 
 
H0
C TC C TC C TC
ADF Unit Root -13,1837* -15,258* -16,9953* -18,8340* -4,4770* -4,614*
Note: One star indicates significance at 5% level
         C refers to the unit root test only with constant, and TC refers to the unit root test with trend and constant
Residuals Fut16 Residuals Fut17 Residuals Fut18
Fut16 Fut17 Fut18
α 0,999 1,000 1,000
(0,003) (0,002) (0,001)
β -0,003 -0,006 -0,008
(0,002) (0,001) (0,0004)
Note: The values without brackers refer to the estimators of the parameters α and β
         and the values in brackers are the standard errors associated with the estimators.
Table 5: Joint significance tests 
 
 
 
 
 
On Table 5, we can see that the estimator of α, the parameter associated with the spot carbon 
price, is very close to its theoretical value, in the three contracts considered.  
For its turn, Table 6 presents us the F-test conducted on the restrictions imposed on α and 
β. Since the F-test values are higher than the critical values for each contract, this means that 
we reject the null hypothesis of α = β = 1. Therefore, since the three contracts are cointegrated 
and show linkages in the long-run, but the restrictions implied by the cost of carry model do 
not hold, that means that the short run price dynamics in this market are not explained by the 
cost of carry model with zero convenience yield, and so this market might not be efficient, in 
its weakest form. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We investigated the presence of arbitrage opportunities and market efficiency in the EU 
ETS following news of unusual levels of profits for this type of securities, after announcements 
of the functioning of the Market Stability Reserve on May 2017. 
For this purpose, the cost of carry model was tested using three EUA futures contracts – 
December 2016, December 2017 and December 2018. The cointegration analysis revealed that 
all the contracts maintain a long-run relationship between the futures and the spot prices, while 
the joint hypothesis of the coefficients associated with the spot prices and the interest rates 
Fut16 Fut17 Fut18
URSS 0,004338 0,016174 0,010047
RRSS 4,688537 84,71513 312,7887
R 2 2 2
T 166 426 653
K 3 3 3
F-stat 88004,20 1107569,51 10117752,78
CV (R; T-K) 2,9957 2,9957 2,9957
Note: URSS refers to Unrestricted Residual Sum of Squares, RRSS to Restricted Residual Sum of Squares, R to the
         number of restrictions, T to the number of observations, K to the number of regressors plus the constant and
         CV (R; T-K) to the critical value for the F-distribution with R number of regressors and T-K degrees of freedom.
being equal to one was clearly rejected by the tests considered, meaning that or the cost of carry 
model with zero convenience yield does not explain well the price dynamics in this market, or 
the market is not efficient in its weakest form, and therefore persistent arbitrage opportunities 
are likely to occur. 
Although these conclusions appear to be consistent with the recent news conveyed by 
financial newspapers, shedding some light about the market inefficiency of the EU ETS, there 
is scope for improvement: the Market Stability Reserve will only start operating in 2019 and 
the expectations regarding its functioning might not correspond to the reality; in fact, the rise 
in prices and the excitement shown by investors might be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Further 
research should focus on the post-implementation of the MSR, especially after the 
announcements released by the European institutions of the 1st year of functioning of this new 
mechanism. 
Apart from the functioning of the MSR, there are still other limitations of the system under 
analysis. The first studies about the efficiency of the EU ETS (Milunovich and Joyeux, 2007; 
Daskalakis and Markellos, 2008) had the same conclusion: the behaviour of the EU ETS is not 
compatible with the weak form of efficiency. If some of the arguments presented by the authors 
were related to the recent birth of the market, the same type of argument is not applicable 
nowadays: almost 15 years have passed since the beginning of the market, and apparently it is 
still not efficient. However, one important argument used to justify this apparent inefficiency 
is still valid: the impossibility to short sell the allowances is one of the factors pointed out by 
the authors of the aforementioned studies. Therefore, further studies should be conducted on 
the reasons behind this inefficiency, to assess if it is due to the design of the European carbon 
system. 
Other limitation could be attributed to the model used in this thesis, especially to the 
assumption made on the convenience yield term. Instead of assuming a value of zero, we could 
simply assume the convenience yield term to be positive: if, when required to settle their carbon 
accounts, the carbon emitters do not have the number of allowances corresponding to the 
amount of emissions released, they are required to pay a fine of 100 € per tonne of CO2 for 
which they have no allowances; in consequence, there might be a premium connected with 
holding the allowances until the settlement date. Even so, we considered that convenience yield 
to be negligible, given that there is a 1.6 billion excess of carbon allowances on the market, 
making the probability of not finding allowances in the market in the time of the settlement date 
very close to 0. Nonetheless, with the introduction of the MSR the number of excess allowances 
will decrease, possibly increasing the premium related with holding the allowances until the 
settlement date, making it different from zero. Studies should be performed on the effectiveness 
of the cost of carry model with a positive convenience yield to explain the price dynamics in 
this market, possibly testing other alternative models to capture the price dynamics observed. 
Lastly, the scope of this analysis was only intra-phase futures contracts. As also shown by 
some authors (Daskalakis, Psychoyios and Markellos, 2009), there are significant differences 
in the pricing of intra and inter-phase contracts. Since inter-phase contracts were not considered, 
an interesting object of study would be the analysis of arbitrage opportunities in both types of 
contracts. 
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